Speeches and Statements
The Tools to Combat Terrorism
Speech by Hazel Blears, Home Office Minister, to the Royal United Services Institute in February 2005.
Many thanks to the Royal United Services Institute for inviting me here today to speak to you. I am delighted to be here.
As you are aware, the Home Office has lead responsibility within Government for counter-terrorism policy, co-ordinating the response to the terrorist threat within the UK and for counter-terrorism legislation.
Combating terrorism is one of the highest priorities for government and one I take responsibility for in support of the Home Secretary. We are of course supported by Ministers across Government who take the lead for their department’s area of expertise. The difference in our system and the US system is the subject of debate. We believe the UK system provides real benefits, a range of responsibilities adding strength.
The Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office has the task of monitoring and co-ordinating the range of departmental work necessary to develop the UK’s resilience and contingency planning ability.
We also have two Ministerial committees chaired by the Home Secretary to bring this work together, supported at official level by Sir David Omand – the Government’s Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator.
To give you a sense of the progress that has been made over the last three years, since 9/11, I am going to give an overview of the main measures that the Government has undertaken in order to prevent and minimise the terrorist threat.
First of all I would like to set these measures in context by outlining the threat that we face from terrorism. I’m aware you will be hearing from David Veness on this subject during the conference.
The Terrorist threat
The threat from terrorism is not new to the UK. We have developed considerable expertise in fighting terrorism over the past 30 years. However, 9/11 did change the way we think about terrorism. It underlined the threat of multiple attacks by terrorists seeking to cause maximum destruction.
That threat remains real and serious.
The most significant terrorist threat to the UK and to UK interests abroad comes from Al Qa’ida and associated networks.
Senior AQ members, including its leader Osama bin Laden, have stated publicly that the UK and UK interests are a priority target for them. There have been a number of attacks specifically targeting UK interests based overseas. In November 2003 5 people died in an Al Qa’ida car bomb attack on the British Consulate and HSBC in Istanbul.
The threat level remains high. The UK Government continues to maintain a state of readiness and we are taking every possible precautionary measure to protect British citizens, consistent with the level of threat. At the same time we must be mindful of the need for a measured, proportionate response, which does not generate unnecessary alarm. Our aim is to keep the public ‘alert but not alarmed’. A difficult balance. The current threat is different – the terrorists are dedicated to mass casualty with little regard for their own safety. During the recent debates on the new legislation the majority of the House of Commons recognised the threat is real and serious and different in character.
CONTEST
In light of this changing nature of threat the Government has developed a long term counter-terrorism strategy for the UK. This strategy is known as CONTEST.
The strategic aim of CONTEST is to ‘reduce the risk from International Terrorism so that our people can go about their business freely and with confidence’. CONTEST’s focus over the next five years must be reducing the risk. That means reducing the threat and our vulnerability..
In strategic terms reducing the risk breaks down into four broad areas: 1) Prevention 2) Pursuit 3) Protection, and 4) Preparedness
Preventing the next generation of terrorists is a long term but vital element of the strategy. We are working with communities throughout the UK to reduce inter-communal tensions and tackle the drivers for terrorist recruitment. To this end we must also help in the resolution of international causes of tension and support good governance, reform and stability.
Pursuing terrorists and those who sponsor them is central to our efforts. It incorporates many strands and involves the co-ordinated effort of numerous agencies. And a robust legislative framework such as ours is key here.
The UK is a world leader in protective security. We are making the UK an increasingly harder target, protecting citizens, institutions and the critical national infrastructure. Furthermore we are raising standards of aviation and maritime security.
The final strategic aim is preparedness – making certain that the people and resources are in place to respond to the consequences of a terrorist attack.
I would like to talk about some elements of these in a little more detail if I may.
Legislation
The Government provides a legislative framework to enable stakeholders to deliver the frontline measures, which ensure an effective counter-terrorism response.
Prior to September 11 the UK already had well developed and robust counter terrorism legislation in the Terrorism Act 2000. It has proved a vital tool in the fight against terrorism with powers to seize terrorist cash at borders and specific offences of inciting terrorist acts and training for terrorist purposes. It outlaws the activities of groups such as Al Qa’ida through the power to proscribe organisations concerned in terrorism.
The Act introduced a wider definition of terrorism than contained in previous legislation. This is in recognition of the fact that terrorism may have a religious or ideological as well as political motivation.
The definition also looks to cover actions that may not in themselves be violent but which can nonetheless have a significant impact on modern life.
It provides that where action involves firearms or explosives, it does not have to be designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public to be included in the definition.
In the Terrorism Act 'terrorism' means the use or threat of action where:
- the action involves serious violence against a person, involves serious damage to property,endangers a person's life, other than that of the person committing the action, creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system.
- The use or threat is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or asection of the public, or
- The use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause
The Terrorism Act 2000 contains a wide range of powers to dismantle the machinery of terrorism to ensure that the UK does not become a “safe haven” for terrorist activity.
Section 41 of the Act gives the police power to arrest anyone reasonably suspected of being a terrorist or having committed certain offences under the Act. The decision to arrest a person under the Act may be the result of an intelligence led operation or the result of an officer’s judgement in circumstances where he feels an arrest is appropriate.
Section 44 - sometimes controversial - of the Act allows an officer to stop and search a vehicle, its occupants or a pedestrian for articles which could be used in connection with terrorism. An officer may conduct a search whether or not he has grounds to suspect the presence of such articles. A separate power exists under section 43 for an officer to stop and search a person whom he reasonably suspects of being a terrorist.
Schedule 7 of the Act enables an examining officer at a port or within the border area to stop and search, question and detain a person connected with entering or leaving Great Britain or Northern Ireland. These powers are used to determine whether the person stopped is, or may have been, concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.
The Government believes that these powers are an essential and proportionate response to the current threat from terrorism.
There are robust safeguards in place to ensure these powers are used appropriately by the police.
However, a number of criticisms and concerns have been raised by the Muslim community, in discussions with the Home Office and the police, about the use of counter terrorism powers. These concerns have included, for example, the perception that the Muslim community may have been or is being particularly targeted when stop and search powers are used.
We are working to develop and improve a close partnership with Muslim communities on issues that concern them, including on counter-terrorism issues. We are undertaking specific work to engage with them, to counteract some of the popular myths about counter-terrorism and to reassure them that the powers are not targeted at them and are being used proportionately and appropriately. I and other Ministers have met the Muslim Council of Britain, the largest Muslim body in the UK, as well as other representatives of the Muslim community to discuss their concerns on many occasions. They have also met with officials in the Home Office and relevant officers in the police service. We intend to continue this work with a managed programme of engagement meetings in 2005 which will ensure that Ministers and officials at all levels in the Home Office meet with a variety of different groups within the community, across the regions in which we have large Muslim populations.
The powers within our legislation are aimed at preventing terrorism whatever its source. They are not aimed at a particular race, religion or any other group. The security of this country is of paramount importance for all of our communities.
The changing nature of the threat, as evidenced by the events of 9/11, meant that the UK had to adapt. The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act therefore made additional provisions.
It strengthened aviation security through new powers enabling the removal and arrest of people in restricted areas, the detention of aircraft for security reasons.
It also strengthened legislation relating to chemical, nuclear and biological weapons, ensuring the protection and security of civil nuclear sites through new offences of aiding and abetting the overseas use or development of such weapons, and weapons training.
It also enhanced the security of dangerous substances that might potentially be targeted or used by terrorists.
Additional terrorist finance measures were also introduced, and I will explain this in a little more detail shortly.
Most notably the Act provided for the detention, pending deportation of foreign nationals suspected of being international terrorists. Part 4 of the Act is an immigration power which enables the Home Secretary to certify and detain foreign nationals who are suspected of involvement in international terrorism and who are believed to present a risk to our national security but cannot, at present, be removed from the United Kingdom. They cannot currently be removed, as a result of either practical considerations, or the United Kingdom’s international obligations, such as those under the European Court of Human Rights. However, the detainees are free to leave this country voluntarily at any time, as two have already chosen to do. Clear in recent times there is also a growing engagement from British citizens.
Whilst Article 5(1) (f) of the ECHR permits the detention of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation, UK caselaw is clear – a person can only be detained if there is a reasonable prospect of their removal within a reasonable time. In the Part 4 cases, where there is a barrier to removal, we would therefore be prevented from detaining these individuals, pending their ultimate removal, without a derogation from the ECHR.
This is why a derogation was sought from Article 5 of the ECHR in relation to the part 4 powers. The detainees challenged the legality of the derogation. On Thursday 16 December 2004 the House of Lords allowed the appeal in the case of A and others V the Secretary of State for Home Department. The Law Lords ruled that the powers in Part 4 section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 were incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 of the ECHR in so far as they are disproportionate, and permit detention of suspected international terrorists in a way that discriminates on the grounds of nationality or immigration status.
As the Home Secretary announced in his statement on 26 January, we are seeking alternatives to the part 4 powers. We are continuing with the work on deportation with assurances for foreign nationals who we can and should deport. We are also planning to introduce control orders, which would enable a range of preventative measures to be placed on a suspected terrorist irrespective of nationality, where we can neither prosecute nor deport. These will be preventative measures designed to disrupt and restrict an individual’s activities where intelligence assessments indicate involvement in terrorism.
These orders will:
- be capable of general application to any suspected terrorist irrespective of nationality and,for most of the controls, the nature of terrorist activity.
- consist of a range of provisions from a ban on the use of communications equipment torestrictions to premises in very serious cases
- allow for a criminal sanction for a breach of any order imposed
- include independent judicial scrutiny of each case involving the hearing of evidence in bothopen and closed session, both against the imposition of an order and any subsequent variations of the provisions.
Details of these proposals were laid before Parliament on 22 February 2005. It is ultimately for Parliament to decide whether and how we should amend the law.
To repeat the words of the Home Secretary in his statement on the 26th January “A careful balance has to be struck between the rights of an individual and the protection of society against threats from organisations which seek to destroy”. We believe that these powers will address this balance in a proportionate and effective manner.
Terrorist Finance
It is important to emphasise that there can be no terrorism without money.
The amounts involved do not necessarily have to be large. They will vary according to the strategies and methods adopted by the terrorists. Whereas some will have major projects (such as the acquisition of sophisticated weaponry, recruitment or the provision of welfare to their supporters) that require significant long-term funding, others will have more modest financial needs.
However, all terrorists need money to finance expenditure, if only for day to day living expenses. As such, there is an almost constant need for them to raise and move money.
The means by which they do so encompasses a wide range of both legal and illegal activity. Terrorism can often be financed from legitimately obtained income. Charitable contributions, for example, can be major sources of funding, with Non-Governmental Organisations having been the focus of much investigative work over recent years. Informal money transfer systems can also be vulnerable to use by terrorists and terrorist organisations.
At central Government level, significant advances have been achieved. Following a review in January 2002, it was decided that more effective co-ordination of terrorist finance issues was needed at the centre. So a Cabinet Office committee consisting of senior officials and representatives and chaired by the Home Office was established. It has proved very effective in bringing together policy-makers with the law enforcement agencies, and also in linking these organisations with those whose focus is on ordinary criminal finance.
The Government’s strategy for countering terrorist finance has two main aims. Firstly, to deter, disrupt and cut off terrorists’ sources of funding, wherever it originates from. The objective is to create a hostile environment for them to work in by reducing their capability and weakening their position by attacking their resources through investigation, seizure and the freezing of their assets. Secondly, to use intelligence to identify and track terrorists and their activities.
With regard to the first aim, that of disruption, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 toughened considerably our previous legislation to provide new measures on asset freezing, account monitoring and cash seizures throughout the UK.
The Police workload has increased considerably over the last two years and, with the additional funding that we have provided, staffing has been increased nearly fourfold. This has resulted in greatly enhanced identification and investigation of terrorist fundraising activity.
In terms of the use of intelligence, the Police rely heavily upon the dedicated Terrorist Finance Team (TFT) within the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) that was created in November 2001. This Unit comprises personnel from law enforcement, regulatory and intelligence agencies.
The TFT’s main purpose is to examine financial disclosures from the regulated sector for possible terrorist connections and to recommend action as appropriate.
The TFT also works on the identification of legitimate business organisations which are either wittingly funding terrorist groups or are exposed to, or are being abused by, those seeking to raise funds through racketeering and extortion.
At this point, I think it is worth highlighting the vital contribution made by the UK financial services industry to the fight against terrorist finance activity. UK banks and financial institutions have co-operated fully and constructively in seeking out terrorist funding, often redirecting significant resources in response to national and international enquiries. This support has proved invaluable, and I would like to put on record the appreciation of Ministers and myself for the assistance that has been offered.
It is important to recognise what is being achieved not only in the domestic sphere but also in terms of international co-operation. Because of the risks of detection, terrorists and ordinary financial criminals alike are today transnational in their outlook and methods, raising funds in one jurisdiction, banking or holding them in a second, and then deploying them in others. Combating the financing of terrorism therefore requires collective and co-ordinated international action.
Critical National Infrastructure
I welcome support from the business community in this area.
There is of course no such thing as a security guarantee. That is why we must strengthen defences against terrorist attack by having appropriate protective security in place.
Priorities within the UK are to:
- safeguard the public and minimise disruption to normal daily life;
- ensure that those people and organisations in both government and industry who need to protect against and respond to terrorist attack can do so effectively;
- enable all businesses and organisations to understand the risk they face and are in a position to apply a proportionate level of security measures to protect themselves, their employees and their assets.
UK protective security strategy integrates physical security, personnel security and security of information including protection from electronic attack. It is based on:
- clear understanding of what constitutes critical sectors, assets and targets within the national infrastructure – known as the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) - and where they are most vulnerable;
- the building of teams of experts capable of providing both sector and site specific advice onrisk and proportionate protective security;
- a proportionate regulatory framework consistent with international norms as a minimum but strengthened where necessary to meet the UK’s particular needs;
Closing remarks
Our aim first and foremost is to prevent terrorism and secondly to ensure we have the means to deal swiftly and expertly with possible consequences.
We have well prepared contingency plans, which are regularly tested reviewed and updated in light of changing domestic and international circumstances. Since 9/11 have subjected them to rigorous scrutiny
We have undertaken an enormous amount of work within government, agencies and the police to review and improve resilience in the UK
There is frustration about how to find a way to engage in a better dialogue with the public but the issue papers published yesterday are a good start.
I am not pretending that any of this will make the UK a risk free zone – there can be no such thing – but we are fully engaged in making sure we are in the best position to cope with any threat.
Thank you.
