Speeches and Statements

Inquiry by Sir Christopher Rose into surveillance at HMP Woodhhill

Statement to the House of Commons by Jacqui Smith, Home Secretary, on the publication of the report by Sir Christopher Rose into surveillance at Woodhill Prison, in February 2008.

With permission, Mr Speaker, I should like to make a statement. As the House will recall, in his statement on 4 February 2008, My Right Hon Friend, the Justice Secretary announced that he and I had jointly agreed to ask the Chief Surveillance Commissioner, Sir Christopher Rose, to conduct an inquiry:

"To investigate the circumstances relating to the visits to Babar Ahmad at HMP Woodhill by Sadiq Khan MP in May 2005 and June 2006, to establish whether the visits were subject to any form of surveillance and if so by whose authority and with whose knowledge, and to report his findings to the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary and the Justice Secretary."

Mr Speaker, Sir Christopher has now completed his inquiry and submitted his report. I should like to thank Sir Christopher for his work and the speed and efficiency which he carried it out. I am today laying his report before the House. Copies are available in the Vote Office.

Mr Speaker, there should be absolutely no doubt about the vital importance of covert surveillance techniques and the contribution they make to the protection of us all from terrorism and other serious crime. Covert surveillance is an essential tool for the police and security and intelligence agencies, and the ability to make use of it must be preserved.

It is, however, right that its use is carefully regulated. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 mandates the form of authorisation and inspection for a range of investigatory powers. These include two distinct types of surveillance - Intrusive Surveillance and Directed Surveillance. Intrusive Surveillance is defined as the covert acquisition of information on a residential premise or in a private vehicle. It requires the authorisation of a Secretary of State, or of a chief constable or equivalent, together with the approval of a Surveillance Commissioner. Directed Surveillance is any other covert surveillance that does not constitute Intrusive Surveillance. Directed Surveillance can be approved by senior officers in the police, but does not require under any circumstances authorisation by a Secretary of State.

The House will be aware that the Act also covers the interception of communications. This is a power that can only be used for limited purposes, and requires in each case the explicit prior authorisation of a Secretary of State.

It is to interception, and to other surveillance requiring the approval of a Secretary of State, that the Wilson doctrine applies. Sir Christopher makes clear that:

"the surveillance which I am investigating does not appear to me to be within the Wilson Doctrine, because it does not give rise to interception as defined by the legislation, nor would it require authorisation by the Secretary of State."

This is in line with the Government’s stated position on the Doctrine. As the facts set out in Sir Christopher’s report make clear, it is not relevant in this case.

Let there be no doubt: all forms of covert surveillance are subject to a strict and rigorous statutory regime for authorisations; are conducted in accordance with the guidance set out in the statutory Codes of Practice; and are overseen by the various independent Commissioners - normally recently retired members of the senior judiciary - established under the Act to ensure those using these powers do so in compliance with the law and to the highest standards of integrity. There is an independent Tribunal, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, established to investigate and rule on any complaints.

Mr Speaker, I turn now to the details of Sir Christopher’s findings. As he reports, Babar Ahmad was arrested on an extradition warrant on 5 August 2004 and the following day remanded to HM Prison Woodhill. Sir Christopher found that warrants for intrusive surveillance for closed non-legal visits, and for directed surveillance for open non-legal visits to Babar Ahmad were properly and correctly authorised in August and September 2004. The first intrusive surveillance authorisation was cancelled in December 2004. The second and relevant directed surveillance authorisation lasted until December 2006. Sir Christopher has studied all the documentation on this authorisation and its reviews and renewals. He says of this,

"It suffices to say that the documentation shows that correct procedures were followed in accordance with the legislation and Codes of Practice were followed and proper considerations addressed."

Sir Christopher records that my Honourable Friend the member for Tooting visited Babar Ahmad in prison on three occasions, in October 2004, in May 2005 and in June 2006. On the first occasion, before he was elected to this House, he visited as a solicitor, and Sir Christopher finds his visit was not monitored in any way. My Honourable Friend’s later two visits were as an approved visitor under the Approved Visitors Scheme for Category A prisoners. He made an application to be put on this scheme as a friend, and before his election to this House. However Sir Christopher notes that after his election,

"he remained listed in the prison records as a friend."

These two visits, which occurred after my Honourable Friend had become an MP, were monitored by surveillance. It is absolutely clear from Sir Christopher’s report that my Honourable Friend was not the target of this surveillance.

Sir Christopher finds that none of the senior officers responsible for authorising this surveillance knew at the time that the Sadiq Khan listed as a friend was a Member of Parliament. He finds that

"the fact that he is a Member of Parliament first became known to [these officers] as a result of press reports since mid-December 2007."

He concludes however that

"two junior officers who applied for or reviewed authorisation and three who were directly involved in the monitoring knew that Mr Khan was a Member of Parliament, but they had no reason to regard this as significant."

As I have noted above, Sir Christopher concludes that the authorisations were in line with the legislation and Codes of Practice.

In summary, Sir Christopher concludes that

"The conversations between Mr Khan and Babar Ahmad on 21 May 2005 and 24 June 2006 were monitored. The monitoring was carried out lawfully under the legislation. It was properly authorised and fully documented."

Mr Speaker, there have been some concerns raised about the extent of surveillance in prisons. Sir Christopher comments on these. He notes – and I quote – that

"it is difficult and commonly impossible to prove a negative, but detailed enquiries on my behalf show no trace in recent years in prison records or anywhere else of any person known to be a Member of Parliament having been monitored during a prison visit."

There have also been claims made about surveillance of legally privileged conversations between prisoners and solicitors. In my Right Hon Friend’s statement on 4 February he said in respect of conversations between prisoners and their legal advisers: “Those are all subject to explicit safeguards which generally prohibit such interception or surveillance”. The statutory Codes of Practice governing this make clear: “In general, an application for surveillance which is likely to result in the acquisition of legally privileged information should only be made in exceptional and compelling circumstances.” It is though important to note that the legislation does not absolutely forbid the monitoring of such conversations. Sir Christopher says on this point,

"I understand from further enquiries which I have made that, since 2005 at least, there have been no authorities for directed surveillance of legal visits in prisons in England and Wales to prisoners in custody in relation to terrorist or other criminal matters."

I have asked the police service about this matter, and have been assured that this is in fact the case.

Sir Christopher goes on to say, “I know nothing to suggest that any unauthorised directed surveillance has taken place in relation to legal visits to such prisoners during the period to which my investigation relates.” I hope, Mr Speaker, that that deals clearly and fully with the concerns raised. If any honourable Member, or any member of the public, has a specific complaint to make, then the proper thing to do is to refer it to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, which this Government established for precisely that purpose.

I referred earlier, Mr Speaker, to the Wilson doctrine. Though that does not apply in this case, Sir Christopher does suggest that there is some scope for confusion as to the correct inter-relationship between the Wilson Doctrine and the legislation. The Government does not propose to amend the Wilson Doctrine but accepts that current Codes of Practice do not fully clarify the extent to which reviewing officers and authorising officers should pay special attention to conversations involving or potentially involving a Member of Parliament. I am therefore announcing today that the Government will review the statutory Codes of Practice, and in particular that we intend to clarify that, as regards covert surveillance, conversations between Members of Parliament doing their constituency business, and their constituents, should be considered as “confidential information”, and treated in the same way as other confidential information, such as conversations between a person and their lawyer or Minister of religion. This will more clearly give such conversations additional protection.

As regards this particular case, Sir Christopher has found that the procedures for surveillance operations of this kind were properly and lawfully applied and that my hon Friend was not the target of surveillance. Sir Christopher identifies a need to clarify the position with respect to MPs as set out in the Code and I agree. The action I have announced today will ensure this happens.